


22



CREATING AN EMPIRE 1865–1917


WHY DID the United States build an overseas empire?

HOW DID the United States
move toward expanding its
influence before the 1890s?



WHAT EVENTS led to
the Spanish-American War?

WHAT WAS the nature of
U.S. involvement in Asia?



WHAT WAS at stake
for the United States in Puerto Rico,
Cuba, and Panama?




Credits

h. Library of Congress.

IMAGE KEY

for pages 578–579



- a. A colorful poster for the Panama-California Exhibition in San Diego.
- b. Catalog illustration of a Date Palm Tree ca. 1900.
- c. Cover of an American magazine, 1898, commemorating the country's swift victory in the Spanish-American War.
- d. Spanish American War puzzle.
- e. Spanish American War game.
- f. Grey And Red Battle Ship.
- g. Uncle Sam rides a bicycle with globes of the western and eastern hemisphere for wheels while being watched by angry national leaders.
- h. Charles Post, "Spanish Civil War."
- i. Cartoon concerning the "Open Door Policy" 1899. "A Fair Field and No Favor. Uncle Sam: I'm out for commerce, not conquest."
- j. Theodore Roosevelt on a steam shovel during the Panama Canal construction.

Havana, Cuba

October 1901

When the Spanish-American war was declared the United States took a step forward, and assumed a position as protector of the interests of Cuba. It became responsible for the welfare of the people, politically, mentally, and morally. The mere fact of freeing the island from Spanish rule has not ended the care which this country should give. . . . The effect will be to uplift the people, gaining their permanent friendship and support and greatly increasing our own commerce. At present there are two million people requiring clothing and food, for but a small proportion of the necessities of life are raised on the island. It is folly to grow food crops when sugar and tobacco produce such rich revenues in comparison. The United States should supply the Cubans with their breadstuffs, even wine, fruit, and vegetables, and should clothe the people. . . . The money received for their crops will be turned over in a great measure in buying supplies from the United States. . . .

Naturally the manufacturers of the United States should have precedence in furnishing machinery, locomotives, cars, and rails, materials for buildings and bridges, and the wide diversity of other supplies required, as well as fuel for their furnaces. With the present financial and commercial uncertainty at an end the people of the island will . . . come into the American market as customers for products of many kinds.

The meeting of the Constitutional Convention on November 5th will be an event in Cuban history of the greatest importance, and much will depend upon the action and outcome of this convention as to our future control of the island. . . . I considered it unwise to interfere, and I have made it a settled policy to permit the Cubans to manage every part of their constitution-making. This has been due to my desire to prevent any possible charge of crimination being brought against the United States in the direction of their constitutional affairs. . . .

There is no distrust of the United States on the part of the Cubans, and I know of no widespread antipathy to this country, its people, or its institutions. There are, of course, a handful of malcontents, as there must be in every country. . . .

I could not well conceive how the Cubans could be otherwise than grateful to the United States for its efforts in their behalf. The reconstruction of the island has proceeded rapidly from the first, and I think the transformation is without any superior in the history of modern times. The devastation of the long war had left the island in an unparalleled condition when the United States interfered, and in the brief time since the occupation of the island by American troops the island has been completely rehabilitated—agriculturally, commercially, financially, educationally, and governmentally. This improvement has been so rapid and so apparent that no Cuban could mistake it. To doubt in the face of these facts that their liberators were not still their faithful friends would be impossible.

Major-General Leonard Wood, "The Future of Cuba," *The Independent* 54 (January 23, 1902): 193–194; and Wood, "The Cuban Convention," *The Independent* 52 (November 1, 1900): 265–266.



GENERAL LEONARD WOOD'S reports on Cuba, where he was military governor, captured the mixture of attitudes and motives that marked the United States's emergence as a world power. Plans for economic expansion, a belief in national mission, a sense of responsibility to help others, religious impulses and racist convictions—all combined in an uneasy mixture of self-interest and idealism that helped garner support for the new policies that the nation's leaders adopted, including American control over Cuba.

Wood himself had taken a symbolic journey in American expansionism. His earlier career had been with the troops on the American Southwestern frontier, but in 1898 he and Theodore Roosevelt formed the Rough Riders cavalry to participate in the Spanish-American War in Cuba. Upon Spain's surrender, Wood was appointed military governor of the island.

Wood's support for the war was reflected in his activities as a colonial administrator. Convinced of the superiority of American institutions, he favored their expansion. But expansion would also promote American interests. Thus while Wood brought improved sanitation, schools, and transportation to Cuba, he regarded Cubans as backward and incapable of self-government. He expected that American business interests would "naturally" benefit from his reorganization of Cuban life. Wood thus combined paternalistic or humanitarian reforms with attempts to incorporate Cuba into America's new commercial empire, fulfilling the traditional colonial role of providing raw materials and serving as a market for American products and capital.

His claim that he was not interfering with Cuba's constitutional convention was disingenuous, for he had already undertaken to limit those who could participate as voters or delegates and was devising means to restrict Cuba's autonomy. And despite his repeated insistence that the Cubans were "grateful" for the intervention of "their faithful friends," the Americans, Cubans, as well as Filipinos, Puerto Ricans, and others, rarely perceived American motives or American actions as positively as did Wood and other proponents of American expansion. Victory in the Spanish-American War had provided the United States with an empire, status as a world power, and opportunities and problems that would long shape American foreign policy.

THE ROOTS OF IMPERIALISM

The United States had a long-established tradition of expansion across the continent. Through purchase, negotiation, or conquest, the vast Louisiana Territory, Florida, Texas, New Mexico, California, and Oregon had become U.S. territory. Indeed, by the 1890s, Republican Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts boasted that Americans had "a record of conquest, colonization, and territorial expansion unequalled by any people in the nineteenth century." Lodge now urged the country to build an overseas empire, emulating the European model of **imperialism** based on the acquisition and exploitation of colonial possessions. Other Americans favored a less formal empire, in which U.S. interests and influence would be assured through extensive trade and investments rather than through military occupation. Still others advocated a cultural expansionism in which the nation exported its ideals and institutions.

IDEOLOGICAL ARGUMENTS

Scholars, authors, politicians, and religious leaders provided interlocking ideological arguments for the new imperialism (see the overview table "Rationales for Imperialism"). Some intellectuals, for example, invoked social Darwinism, maintaining that "the survival of the fittest" was "the law of nations as well as a law

WHY DID the United States
build an overseas empire?

Imperialism The policy and practice of exploiting nations and peoples for the benefit of an imperial power either directly through military occupation and colonial rule or indirectly through economic domination of resources and markets.



OVERVIEW

RATIONALES FOR IMPERIALISM

Category	Beliefs
Racism and social Darwinism	Convictions that “Anglo-Saxons” were racially superior and should dominate other peoples, either to ensure national success, establish international stability, or benefit the “inferior” races by imposing American ideas and institutions on them.
Righteousness	The conviction that Christianity, and a supporting American culture, should be aggressively spread among the benighted peoples of other lands.
Mahanism	The conviction, following the ideas advanced by Alfred Thayer Mahan, that U.S. security required a strong navy and economic and territorial expansion.
Economics	A variety of arguments holding that American prosperity depended on acquiring access to foreign markets, raw materials, and investment opportunities.



20-3

Albert Beveridge, “The March of the Flag” (1898)

of nature.” As European nations expanded into Asia and Africa in the 1880s and 1890s, seeking colonies, markets, and raw materials, these advocates argued that the United States had to adopt similar policies to ensure national success.

Related to social Darwinism was a pervasive belief in the superiority of people of English, or Anglo-Saxon, descent. To many Americans, the industrial progress, military strength, and political development of England and the United States were proof of an Anglo-Saxon superiority that carried with it a responsibility to extend the blessings of their rule to less able people. As a popular expression put it, colonialism was the “white man’s burden.” The political scientist John W. Burgess argued that Anglo-Saxons “must have a colonial policy” and “righteously assume sovereignty” over “incompetent” or “barbaric races” in other lands.

American missionaries also promoted expansionist sentiment. Hoping to evangelize the world, American religious groups increased the number of Protestant foreign missions sixfold from 1870 to 1900. Missionaries publicized their activities throughout the United States, generating interest in foreign developments and support for what one writer called the “imperialism of righteousness.” Abroad they pursued a religious transformation that often resembled a cultural conversion, for they promoted trade, developed business interests, and encouraged Westernization through technology and education as well as religion. Sometimes, as in the Hawaiian Islands, American missionaries even promoted annexation by the United States.

The Reverend J. H. Barrows in early 1898 lectured on the “Christian conquest of Asia,” suggesting that American Christianity and commerce would cross the Pacific to fulfill “the manifest destiny of the Christian Republic.” Missionaries also contributed to the imperial impulse by describing their work, as Barrows did, in terms of the “conquest” of “enemy” territory. Thus while missionaries were motivated by what they considered to be idealism and often brought real benefits to other lands, especially in education and health, religious sentiments reinforced the ideology of American expansion.

STRATEGIC CONCERNS

Other expansionists were motivated by strategic concerns, shaped by what seemed to be the forces of history and geography. Alfred Thayer Mahan, a naval officer and president of the Naval War College, emphasized the importance of a strong navy



for national greatness in his book *The Influence of Sea Power upon History*. Mahan also proposed that the United States build a canal across the isthmus of Panama to link its coasts, acquire naval bases in the Caribbean and the Pacific to protect the canal, and annex Hawaii and other Pacific islands. The United States must “cast aside the policy of isolation which befitted her infancy,” Mahan declared, and “begin to look outward.”

Mahanism found a receptive audience. Vocal advocates of Mahan’s program were a group of nationalistic Republicans, predominantly from the Northeast. They included politicians like Henry Cabot Lodge and Theodore Roosevelt, journalists like Whitelaw Reid of the *New York Tribune* and Albert Shaw of the *Review of Reviews*, and diplomats and lawyers like John Hay and Elihu Root.

Such men favored imperial expansion, as Shaw wrote, “for the sake of our destiny, our dignity, our influence, and our usefulness.” One British observer concluded that Mahan’s influence had transformed the American spirit, serving “as oil to the flame of ‘colonial expansion’ everywhere leaping into life.” (See American Views, “An American Views the World.”)

The large navy policy popular among imperialists began in 1881, when Congress established the Naval Advisory Board. An extensive program to replace the navy’s obsolete wooden ships with modern cruisers and battleships was well under way by 1890 when the first volume of Mahan’s book appeared. The United States soon possessed a formidable navy, which, in turn, demanded strategic bases and coaling stations. One writer indicated the circular nature of this development by noting in 1893 that Manifest Destiny now meant “the acquisition of such territory, far and near,” that would secure “to our navy facilities desirable for the operations of a great naval power.”

ECONOMIC DESIGNS

Nearly all Americans favored economic expansion through foreign trade. Such a policy promised national prosperity: larger markets for manufacturers and farmers, greater profits for merchants and bankers, more jobs for workers. Far fewer favored the acquisition of colonies that was characteristic of European imperialism. One diplomat declared in 1890 that the nation was more interested in the “annexation of trade” than in the annexation of territory.

As early as 1844, the United States had negotiated a trade treaty with China, and ten years later, a squadron under Commodore Matthew Perry had forced the Japanese to open their ports to American products. In the late nineteenth century, the dramatic expansion of the economy caused many Americans to favor more government action to open foreign markets to American exports. Alabama Senator John Morgan had the cotton and textiles produced in the New South in mind when he warned in 1882: “Our home market is not equal to the demands of our producing and manufacturing classes and to the capital which is seeking



An American missionary and her Chinese converts study the Bible in Manchuria in 903 under a U.S. flag. American missionaries wanted to spread the Gospel abroad but inevitably spread American influence as well.

Photograph reproduced with permission of Wider Church Ministries of the United Church of Christ by permission of the Houghton Library, Harvard University

Mahanism The ideas advanced by Alfred Thayer Mahan, stressing U.S. naval, economic, and territorial expansion.



◆ AMERICAN VIEWS ◆

AN IMPERIALIST VIEWS THE WORLD

Theodore Roosevelt, Henry Cabot Lodge, Alfred Thayer Mahan, and other influential imperialists frequently corresponded with one another. The following excerpts are from Roosevelt's private correspondence in 1897, while he was assistant secretary of the Navy and before the Spanish-American War began.

HOW DOES Roosevelt reflect the influence of Mahan? What is Roosevelt's view of war? How does he view European states and the independence of other nations in the Western Hemisphere?

I suppose that I need not tell you that as regards Hawaii I take your views absolutely, as indeed I do on foreign policy generally. If I had my way we would annex those islands tomorrow. If that is impossible I would establish a protectorate over them. I believe we should build the Nicaraguan canal at once, and in the meantime that we should build a dozen new battleships, half of them on the Pacific Coast; and these battleships should have a large coal capacity and a consequent increased radius of action. . . . I think President Cleveland's action [in rejecting the annexation of Hawaii] was a colossal crime, and we should be guilty of aiding him after the fact if we do not reverse what he did. I earnestly hope we can make the President [McKinley] look at things our way. Last Saturday night Lodge pressed his views upon him with all his strength.

I agree with all you say as to what will be the result if we fail to take Hawaii. It will show that we either have lost, or else wholly lack, the masterful instinct which alone can make a race great. I feel so deeply about it I hardly dare express myself in full. The terrible part is to see that it is the men of education who take the lead in trying to make us prove traitors to our race.

I fully realize the importance of the Pacific coast . . . But there are big problems in the West Indies also.

Until we definitely turn Spain out of those islands (and if I had my way that would be done tomorrow), we will always be menaced by trouble there. We should acquire the Danish Islands [in the West Indies], and by turning Spain out should serve notice that no strong European power, and especially not Germany, should be allowed to gain a foothold by supplanting some weak European power. I do not fear England; Canada is a hostage for her good behavior.

I wish we had a perfectly consistent foreign policy, and that this policy was that every European power should be driven out of America, and every foot of American soil, including the nearest islands in both the Pacific and the Atlantic, should be in the hands of independent American states, and so far as possible in the possession of the United States or under its protection.

To speak with a frankness which our timid friends would call brutal, I would regard a war with Spain from two standpoints: first, the advisability on the grounds both of humanity and self-interest of interfering on behalf of the Cubans, and of taking one more step toward the complete freeing of America from European dominion; second, the benefit done our people by giving them something to think of which isn't material gain, and especially the benefit done our military forces by trying both the Navy and the Army in actual practice. I should be very sorry not to see us make the experiment of trying to land, and therefore feed and clothe, an expeditionary force [on Cuba], if only for the sake of learning from our own blunders. I should hope that the force would have some fighting to do. It would be a great lesson, and we would profit much by it.

I wish there was a chance that the [U.S. battleship] Maine was going to be used against some foreign power; by preference Germany—but I am not particular, and I'd take even Spain if nothing better offered.

Source: Reprinted by permission of the publisher from *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt* Volume I 1868–1898, selected and edited by Elting E. Morison, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.



employment. . . . We must either enlarge the field of our traffic, or stop the business of manufacturing just where it is.” More ominous, a naval officer trying to open Korea to U.S. products declared in 1878, “We must *export* these products or *deport* the people who are creating them.”

Exports, particularly of manufactured goods, which grew ninefold between 1865 and 1900, did increase greatly in the late nineteenth century. Still, periodic depressions fed these fears of overproduction, and the massive unemployment and social unrest that accompanied these economic crises also provided social and political arguments for economic relief through foreign trade.

In the depression of the 1890s, this interest in foreign trade became obsessive. More systematic government efforts to promote trade seemed necessary, a conclusion strengthened by new threats to existing American markets, including higher European tariffs. Moreover, Japan and the European imperial powers began to restrict commercial opportunities in the areas of China that they controlled.

FIRST STEPS

Before the mid-1890s, the government did not pursue a policy of *isolationism* from international affairs, for the nation maintained normal diplomatic and trade ties and at times vigorously intervened in Latin America and East Asia. But in general the government deferred to the initiative of private interests, reacted haphazardly to outside events, and did little to create a professional foreign service. In a few bold if inconsistent steps, however, the United States moved toward expanding its influence.

SEWARD AND BLAINE

Two secretaries of state, William H. Seward, secretary under Presidents Lincoln and Andrew Johnson (1861–1869), and James G. Blaine, secretary under Presidents Garfield and Harrison (1881, 1889–1892), laid the foundation for a larger and more aggressive American role in world affairs. Seward possessed an elaborate imperial vision, based on his understanding of commercial opportunities, strategic necessities, and national destiny. Seward purchased Alaska from Russia in 1867, approved the navy’s occupation of the Midway Islands in the Pacific, pushed American trade on a reluctant Japan, and repeatedly tried to acquire Caribbean naval bases (see Map 22–1). But his policy of expansion, as one observer noted, “went somewhat too far and too fast for the public,” and many of his plans fizzled. Congressional opposition frustrated his efforts to obtain Haiti and the Dominican Republic and to purchase the Danish West Indies; Colombia blocked his attempt to gain construction rights for a canal across the isthmus of Panama.

Blaine was an equally vigorous advocate of expansion. He worked to extend what he called America’s “commercial empire” in the Pacific. And he sought to ensure U.S. sovereignty over any canal in Panama, insisting that it be “a purely American waterway to be treated as part of our own coastline.” In an effort to induce the nations of Latin America to import manufactured products from the United States rather than Europe, Blaine proposed a conference among the nations of the Western Hemisphere in 1881. The First International American Conference finally met in 1889. There Blaine called for the establishment of a customs union to reduce trade barriers. He expected this union to strengthen U.S. control of hemispheric markets. The Latin America nations, however, wary of economic subordination to the colossus of the north, rejected Blaine’s plan.

HOW DID the United States move toward expanding its global influence before the 1890s?

WHERE TO LEARN MORE



Seward House,
Auburn, New York

WHERE TO LEARN MORE




James G. Blaine House,
Augusta, Maine



MAP EXPLORATION

To explore an interactive version of this map, go to <http://www.prenhall.com/goldfield2/map22.1>



MAP 22-1

United States Expansion in the Pacific, 1867–1899 Pursuing visions of a commercial empire in the Pacific, the United States steadily expanded its territorial possessions as well as its influence there in the late nineteenth century.

WHAT DID the United States gain from its expansion in the Pacific?

HAWAII

Blaine regarded Hawaii as “indispensably” part of “the American system.” As early as 1842, the United States had announced its opposition to European control of Hawaii, a key way station in the China trade where New England missionaries and whalers were active. Although the islands remained under native monarchs, American influence grew, particularly as other Americans arrived to establish sugar plantations and eventually dominate the economy.

Treaties in 1875 and 1887 integrated the islands into the American economy and gave the United States control over Pearl Harbor on the island of Oahu. In 1887, the United States rejected a proposal from Britain and France for a joint guarantee of Hawaii’s independence and endorsed a new Hawaiian constitution that gave political power to wealthy white residents. The obvious next step was U.S. annexation, which Blaine endorsed in 1891.

American planters soon bid for annexation. The McKinley Tariff Act of 1890 effectively closed the U.S. market to Hawaiian sugar producers, facing them with economic ruin. At the same time, Queen Liliuokalani moved to restore native control



QUICK REVIEW

Hawaii

- ◆ 1875–1876: Treaties integrate Hawaii into American economy.
- ◆ McKinley Tariff Act (1890) closes U.S. market to Hawaiian sugar.
- ◆ 1893: U.S. supports overthrow of Hawaiian government.

of Hawaiian affairs. To ensure market access and protect their political authority, the American planters decided to seek annexation to the United States. In 1893, they overthrew the queen. John Stevens, the American minister, ordered U.S. Marines to help the rebels. He then declared an American protectorate over the new Hawaii government and wired Washington: “The Hawaiian pear is now fully ripe, and this is the golden hour for the United States to pluck it.” A delegation from the new provisional government, containing no native Hawaiians, went to Washington to draft a treaty for annexation. President Harrison signed the pact but could not get Senate approval before the new Cleveland administration took office.

Cleveland immediately called for an investigation of the whole affair. Soon convinced that “the undoubted sentiment of the people is for the Queen, against the provisional Government, and against annexation,” Cleveland apologized to the queen for the “flagrant wrong” done her by the “reprehensible conduct of the American minister and the unauthorized presence on land of a military force of the United States.” But the American-dominated provisional government refused to step down, and Cleveland’s rejection of annexation set off a noisy debate.

Many Republicans strongly supported annexation. One Eastern Republican manufacturer called for the annexation of Hawaii as the first step toward making the Pacific “an American ocean, dominated by American commercial enterprise for all time.” On the West Coast, where California business interests had close ties with the islands, the commercial and strategic value of Hawaii seemed obvious. The *San Francisco Examiner* declared, “Hoist the Stars and Stripes. It is a case of manifest destiny.” Reflecting racial imperialism, others argued that annexation would both fittingly reward the enterprising white residents of Hawaii and provide an opportunity to civilize native Hawaiians.

Democrats generally opposed annexation. They doubted, as Missouri Senator George Vest declared, whether the United States should desert its traditional principles and “venture upon the great colonial system of the European powers.” The Hawaiian episode of 1893 thus foreshadowed the arguments over imperialism at the end of the century and emphasized the policy differences between Democrats and the increasingly expansionist Republicans.

CHILE AND VENEZUELA

American reactions to developments in other countries in the 1890s also reflected an increasingly assertive national policy and excitable public opinion. In 1891, American sailors on shore leave in Chile became involved in a drunken brawl that left two of them dead, seventeen injured, and dozens in jail. Encouraged by a combative navy, President Harrison threatened military retaliation against Chile, provoking an outburst of bellicose nationalism in the United States. Harrison relented only when Chile apologized and paid an indemnity.

A few years later, the United States again threatened war over a minor issue, but against a more formidable opponent. In 1895, President Cleveland intervened in a boundary dispute between Great Britain and Venezuela over British Guiana. Cleveland was motivated not only by the long-standing U.S. goal of challenging Britain for Latin American markets but also by ever more expansive notions of the **Monroe Doctrine** and the authority of the United States. Secretary of State Richard Olney sent Britain a blunt note (a “twenty-inch gun,” Cleveland called it) demanding arbitration of the disputed territory and stoutly asserting American supremacy in the Western Hemisphere. Cleveland urged Congress to establish a commission to determine the boundary and enforce its decision by war if necessary. As war fever swept the United States, Britain agreed to arbitration, recognizing the limited nature of the issue that so convulsed Anglo-American relations.

WHERE TO LEARN MORE



Mission Houses,
Honolulu, Hawaii

www.missionhouses.org/

Monroe Doctrine Declaration by President James Monroe in 1823 that the Western Hemisphere was to be closed off to further European colonization and that the United States would not interfere in the internal affairs of European nations.



CHRONOLOGY

<p>1861–1869 Seward serves as secretary of state.</p> <p>1867 U.S. purchases Alaska from Russia.</p> <p>1870 Annexation of the Dominican Republic is rejected.</p> <p>1881 Naval Advisory Board is created.</p> <p>1887 U.S. gains naval rights to Pearl Harbor.</p> <p>1889 First Pan-American Conference is held.</p> <p>1890 Alfred Thayer Mahan publishes <i>The Influence of Sea Power upon History</i>.</p> <p>1893 Harrison signs but Cleveland rejects a treaty for the annexation of Hawaii.</p> <p>1893–1897 Depression increases interest in economic expansion abroad.</p> <p>1894–1895 Sino-Japanese War is fought.</p> <p>1895 U.S. intervenes in Great Britain–Venezuelan boundary dispute. Cuban insurrection against Spain begins.</p> <p>1896 William McKinley is elected president on an imperialist platform.</p> <p>1898 Spanish-American War is fought. Hawaii is annexed. Anti-Imperialist League is organized. Treaty of Paris is signed.</p>	<p>1899–1902 Filipino-American War is fought.</p> <p>1899 Open Door note is issued.</p> <p>1901 Theodore Roosevelt becomes president.</p> <p>1903 Platt Amendment restricts Cuban autonomy. Panama “revolution” is abetted by the United States.</p> <p>1904 United States acquires the Panama Canal Zone. Roosevelt Corollary is announced.</p> <p>1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War is fought.</p> <p>1905 Treaty of Portsmouth ends the Russo-Japanese War through U.S. mediation.</p> <p>1906–1909 United States occupies Cuba.</p> <p>1907–1908 Gentlemen’s Agreement restricts Japanese immigration.</p> <p>1909 United States intervenes in Nicaragua.</p> <p>1912–1933 United States occupies Nicaragua.</p> <p>1914 Panama Canal opens.</p> <p>1914–1917 United States intervenes in Mexico.</p> <p>1915–1934 United States occupies Haiti.</p> <p>1916–1924 United States occupies the Dominican Republic.</p> <p>1917 Puerto Ricans are granted U.S. citizenship.</p> <p>1917–1922 United States occupies Cuba.</p>
--	--

The United States’ assertion of hemispheric dominance angered Latin Americans, and their fears deepened when it decided arbitration terms with Britain without consulting Venezuela, which protested before bowing to American pressure. The further significance of the Venezuelan crisis, as Captain Mahan noted, lay in its “awakening of our countrymen to the fact that we must come out of our isolation . . . and take our share in the turmoil of the world.”

THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

WHAT EVENTS led to the Spanish-American War?

The forces pushing the United States toward imperialism and international power came to a head in the Spanish-American War. Cuba’s quest for independence from the oppressive colonial control of Spain activated Americans’ long-standing interest in the island. But few foresaw that the war that finally erupted in 1898 would dramatically change America’s relationships with the rest of the world and give it a colonial empire.

THE CUBAN REVOLUTION

Cuba was the last major European colony in Latin America, with an economic potential that attracted American business interests and a strategic significance for any Central American canal. In the 1880s, Spanish control became increasingly harsh, and in 1895 the Cubans launched a revolt.



The rebellion was a classic guerrilla war in which the rebels controlled the countryside and the Spanish army the towns and cities. American economic interests were seriously affected, for both Cubans and Spaniards destroyed American property and disrupted American trade. But the brutality with which Spain attempted to suppress the revolt promoted American sympathy for the Cuban insurgents. Determined to cut the rebels off from their peasant supporters, the Spaniards herded most civilians into “reconcentration camps,” where tens of thousands died of starvation and disease.

Americans’ sympathy was further aroused by the sensationalist **yellow press**. To attract readers and boost advertising revenues, the popular press of the day adopted bold headlines, fevered editorials, and real or exaggerated stories of violence, sex, and corruption. A circulation war between William Randolph Hearst’s *New York Journal* and Joseph Pulitzer’s *New York World* helped stimulate interest in Cuban war. “Blood on the roadsides, blood on the fields, blood on the doorsteps, blood, blood, blood! The old, the young, the weak, the crippled—all are butchered without mercy,” the *World* feverishly reported of Cuba. “Is there no nation wise enough, brave enough to aid this blood-smitten land?” The nation’s religious press, partly because it reflected the prejudice many Protestants held against Catholic Spain, also advocated American intervention.

As the Cuban rebellion dragged on, more and more Americans advocated intervention to stop the carnage, protect U.S. investments, or uphold various principles. Expansionists like Roosevelt and Lodge clamored for intervention, but so did their opponents. Populists, for example, sympathized with a people seeking independence from colonial rule and petitioned Congress to support the crusade for Cuban freedom. In the election of 1896, both major parties endorsed Cuban independence.

GROWING TENSIONS

President William McKinley’s administration soon focused on Cuba. McKinley’s principal complaint was that chronic disorder in Cuba disrupted America’s investments and agitated public opinion. Personally opposed to military intervention, McKinley first used diplomacy to press Spain to adopt reforms that would settle the rebellion. Following his instructions, the U.S. minister to Spain warned the Spanish government that if it did not quickly establish peace, the United States would take whatever steps it “should deem necessary to procure this result.” In late 1897, Spain modified its brutal military tactics and offered limited autonomy to Cuba. But Cubans insisted on complete independence, which Spain refused to grant.

Relations between the United States and Spain deteriorated. On February 15, 1898, the U.S. battleship *Maine* blew up in Havana harbor, killing 260 men. The Spaniards were not responsible for the tragedy, which a modern naval inquiry has attributed to an internal accident. But many Americans agreed with Theodore Roosevelt, the assistant secretary of the navy, who called it “an act of dirty treachery on the part of the Spaniards” and told McKinley that only war was “compatible with our national honor.”

Other pressures soon began to build on the president. Senator Lodge reported a consensus “that this situation must end. We cannot go on indefinitely with this strain, this suspense, and this uncertainty, this tottering upon the verge of war. It is killing to business.” McKinley also feared that a moderate policy would endanger congressional candidates. Again Senator Lodge, although hesitant to suggest “war for political reasons,” nevertheless advised McKinley, “If the war in Cuba drags on through the summer with nothing done, we shall go down in the greatest [election] defeat ever known.”

QUICK REVIEW

The Press and Cuba

- ◆ Yellow press stimulated interest in Cuba.
- ◆ Newspapers emphasized violence, sex, and corruption.
- ◆ Much of America’s religious press advocated American intervention.

Yellow press A deliberately sensational journalism of scandal and exposure designed to attract an urban mass audience and increase advertising revenues.



At the end of March 1898, McKinley sent Spain an ultimatum. He demanded an armistice in Cuba, an end to the reconcentration policy, and the acceptance of American arbitration, which implied Cuban independence. Desperately, Spain made concessions, abolishing reconcentration and declaring a unilateral armistice, but McKinley had already begun war preparations. He submitted a war message to Congress on April 11, asking for authority to use force against Spain “in the name of humanity, in the name of civilization, in behalf of endangered American interests.” Congress declared war on Spain on April 25, 1898.

Most interventionists were not imperialists, and Congress added the **Teller Amendment** to the war resolution, disclaiming any intention of annexing Cuba and promising that Cubans would govern themselves. Congress also refused to approve either a canal bill or the annexation of Hawaii. Nevertheless, the Spanish-American War did turn the nation toward imperialism.

WAR AND EMPIRE

The decisive engagement of the war took place not in Cuba but in another Spanish colony, the Philippines, and it involved the favored tool of the expansionists, the new navy (see Map 22–2). Once war was declared, Commodore George Dewey led the U.S. Asiatic squadron into Manila Bay and destroyed the weaker Spanish fleet on May 1, 1898. The navy had long coveted Manila Bay as a strategic harbor, but other Americans, casting an eye on commercial opportunities in China, saw a greater significance in the victory. With Dewey’s triumph, exulted one expansionist, “We are taking our proper rank among the nations of the world. We are after markets, the greatest markets now existing in the world.” To expand this foothold in Asia, McKinley ordered troops to the Philippines, postponing the military expedition to Cuba itself.

Dewey’s victory also precipitated the annexation of Hawaii, which had seemed hopeless only weeks before. Annexationists now pointed to the islands’ strategic importance as steppingstones to Manila. “To maintain our flag in the Philippines, we must raise our flag in Hawaii,” the *New York Sun* contended. McKinley himself privately declared, “We need Hawaii just as much and a good deal more than we did California. It is Manifest Destiny.” In July, Congress approved annexation, a decision welcomed by Hawaii’s white minority. Natives solemnly protested this step taken “without reference to the consent of the people of the Hawaiian Islands.” Filipinos would soon face the same American imperial impulse.

Military victory also came swiftly in Cuba, once the U.S. Army finally landed in late June. Victory depended largely on Spanish ineptitude, for the American troops had to fight with antiquated weapons and wear wool uniforms in the sweltering tropics. They were issued rotting and poisoned food by a corrupt and inefficient War Department. More than five thousand Americans died of diseases and accidents brought on by such mismanagement; only 379 were killed in battle. State militias supplemented the small regular army, as did volunteer units, such as the famous Rough Riders, a cavalry unit of cowboys and eastern dandies assembled by Theodore Roosevelt.

U.S. naval power again proved decisive. In a lopsided battle on July 3, the obsolete Spanish squadron in Cuba was destroyed, isolating the Spanish army and guaranteeing its defeat. U.S. forces then seized the nearby Spanish colony of Puerto Rico without serious opposition. Humbled, Spain signed an armistice ending the war on August 12.

Americans were delighted with their military achievements, but the *Philadelphia Inquirer* cautioned, “With peace will come new responsibilities, which must be met. We have colonies to look after and develop.”



WHERE TO LEARN MORE

- ★ Funston Memorial Home, Iola, Kansas
<http://skyways.lib.ks.us/museums/funston/>

QUICK REVIEW

Dewey's Victory


- ◆ May 1, 1898: Dewey's squadron destroys Spanish fleet in Manila Bay.
- ◆ Expansionists saw victory as an opportunity for greater U.S. presence in the region.
- ◆ McKinley followed up Dewey's victory by sending troops to the Philippines.

Teller Amendment A congressional resolution adopted in 1898 renouncing any American intention to annex Cuba.



MAP EXPLORATION

To explore an interactive version of this map, go to <http://www.prenhall.com/goldfield2/map22.2>



MAP 22-2

The Spanish-American War The United States gained quick victories in both theaters of the Spanish-American War. Its naval power proved decisive, with Commodore Dewey destroying one enemy fleet in the Philippines and a second U.S. naval force cutting off the Spanish in Cuba.

WHY DID the United States want to control the Philippines?

THE TREATY OF PARIS

The armistice required Spain to accept Cuban independence, cede Puerto Rico and Guam (a Pacific island between Hawaii and the Philippines), and allow the Americans to occupy Manila pending the final disposition of the Philippines at a formal peace conference. The acquisition of Puerto Rico and Guam indicated the expansionist nature the conflict had assumed for the United States. So did the postponement of the Philippine issue. McKinley knew that delay would permit the advocates of expansion to build public support for annexation.

But he was motivated to acquire the Philippines primarily by a determination to use the islands to strengthen America's political and commercial position in East Asia. Moreover, he believed the Filipinos poorly suited to self-rule, and he feared that Germany or Japan might seize the Philippines if the United States did not. Meeting in Paris in December, American and Spanish negotiators settled the final terms for peace. Spain agreed—despite Filipino demands for independence—to cede the Philippines to the United States.



20-5

William McKinley, "Decision on the Philippines" (1900)



The decision to acquire the Philippines sparked a dramatic debate over the ratification of the Treaty of Paris. The *United States Investor* spoke for business leaders, for example, in demanding the Philippines as “a base of operations in the East” to protect American interests in China; other economic expansionists argued that the Philippines themselves had valuable resources and were a market for American goods or warned that “our commercial rivals in the Orient” would grab the islands if the United States did not. The *Presbyterian Banner* spoke for what it termed a nearly unanimous religious press in affirming “the desirability of America’s retaining the Philippines as a duty in the interest of human freedom and Christian progress.”

Opponents of the treaty included such prominent figures as the civil service reformer Carl Schurz, steel baron Andrew Carnegie, social reformer Jane Addams, labor leader Samuel Gompers, and author Mark Twain. Their organizational base was the Anti-Imperialist League, which campaigned against the treaty, distributing pamphlets, petitioning Congress, and holding rallies. League members’ criticisms reflected a conviction that imperialism was a repudiation of America’s moral and political traditions embodied in the Declaration of Independence. The acquisition of overseas colonies, they argued, conflicted with the nation’s commitment to liberty and its claim to moral superiority. They regarded as loathsome and hypocritical the transformation of a war to free Cuba into a campaign for imperial conquest and subjugation. Some African Americans derided the rhetoric of Anglo-Saxon superiority that underlay imperialism and even organized the Black Man’s Burden Association to promote Philippine independence.

But other arguments were less high-minded. Many anti-imperialists objected to expansion on the racist grounds that Filipinos were inferior and unassimilable. Gompers feared that cheap Asian labor would undercut the wages and living standards of American workers. The *San Francisco Call*, representing California-Hawaiian sugar interests, also wanted no competition from the Philippines.

Finally, on February 6, 1899, the Senate narrowly ratified the treaty. Then, by a single vote, the Republicans defeated a Democratic proposal for Philippine independence once a stable government had been established; the United States would keep the islands.

William Jennings Bryan attempted to make the election of 1900 a referendum on “the paramount issue” of imperialism, promising to free the Philippines if the Democrats won. But some of the most ardent anti-imperialists were conservatives who remained loyal to McKinley because they could not tolerate Bryan’s economic policies. Republicans also played on the nationalist emotions evoked by the war, especially by nominating Theodore Roosevelt for vice president. “If you choose to vote for America, if you choose to vote for the flag for which we fought,” Roosevelt said, “then you will vote to sustain the administration of President McKinley.” Bryan lost again, as in 1896, and under Republican leadership, the United States became an imperial nation.

QUICK REVIEW

The Anti-Imperialist League

- ◆ Central to campaign against the Treaty of Paris (ratified 1899).
- ◆ League members saw treaty as a repudiation of American moral and political traditions.
- ◆ Many anti-imperialists objected to expansion on racist grounds.

IMPERIAL AMBITIONS: THE UNITED STATES AND EAST ASIA, 1899–1917

WHAT WAS the nature of U.S. involvement in Asia?

In 1899, as the United States occupied its new empire, Assistant Secretary of State John Bassett Moore observed that the nation had become “a world power. . . . Where formerly we had only commercial interests, we now have territorial and political interests as well.” American policies to promote those expanded interests focused first on East Asia and Latin America, where the Spanish-American War had provided the United States with both opportunities and challenges. In Asia, the first issue concerned the fate of the Philippines, but looming beyond it were American ambitions in China, where other imperial nations had their own goals.



THE FILIPINO-AMERICAN WAR

Filipino nationalists, like Cuban insurgents, were already fighting Spain for their independence before the sudden American intervention. The Filipino leader, Emilio Aguinaldo, welcomed Dewey's naval victory as the sign of a *de facto* alliance with the United States; he then issued a declaration of independence and proclaimed the Philippine Republic. But the Filipinos' optimism declined as American officials acted in an increasingly imperious manner toward them, first refusing to meet with the "savages," then insisting that Filipino forces withdraw from Manila or face "forcible action," and finally dismissing the claims of Aguinaldo and "his so-called government." When the Treaty of Paris provided for U.S. ownership rather than independence, Filipinos felt betrayed. Mounting tensions erupted in a battle between American and Filipino troops outside Manila on February 4, 1899, sparking a long and brutal war.

Ultimately, the United States used nearly four times as many soldiers to suppress the Filipinos as to defeat Spain in Cuba and, in a tragic irony, employed many of the same brutal methods for which it had condemned Spain. Americans often made little effort to distinguish between soldiers and noncombatants, viewing all Filipinos with racial antagonism. Before the military imposed censorship on war news, reporters confirmed U.S. atrocities; one wrote that "American troops have been relentless, have killed to exterminate men, women, and children, prisoners and captives, active insurgents and suspected people, from lads of 10 and up." A California newspaper defended such actions with remarkable candor: "Let us all be frank. WE DO NOT WANT THE FILIPINOS. WE DO WANT THE PHILIPPINES. . . . The more of them killed the better. It seems harsh. But they must yield before the superior race."

The overt racism of the war repelled African Americans. John Mitchell, a Virginia editor, condemned all the talk of "white man's burden" as deceptive rhetoric for brutal acts that could not be "defended either in moral or international law."

The Anti-Imperialist League revived, citing the war as proof of the corrosive influence of imperialism on the nation's morals and principles. Professors addressed antiwar rallies on college campuses. "Alas, what a fall," one University of Michigan professor told his audience. "Within the circuit of a single year to have declined from the moral leadership of mankind into the common brigandage of the robber nations of the world."

By 1902, however, the American military had largely suppressed the rebellion, and the United States had established a colonial government. Compared to the Americans' brutal war policies, U.S. colonial rule was relatively benign, though paternalistic. William Howard Taft, the first governor general, launched a program that brought the islands new schools and roads, a public health system, and an economy tied closely to both the United States and a small Filipino elite.

CHINA AND THE OPEN DOOR

America's determined involvement in the Philippines reflected its preoccupation with China. By the mid-1890s, other powers threatened prospects for American commercial expansion in China. Japan, after defeating China in 1895, annexed Taiwan and secured economic privileges in the mainland province of Fukien (Fujian); the major European powers then competed aggressively to claim other areas of China as their own **spheres of influence**. In Manchuria, Russia won control of Port Arthur (Lüshun) and the right to construct a railway. Germany secured a ninety-nine year lease on another Chinese port and mining and railroad privileges on the Shandong Peninsula. The British wrung special concessions in Kowloon, opposite Hong Kong, as well as a port facing the Russians in Manchuria. France gained a lease on ports and exclusive commercial privileges in southern China.

QUICK REVIEW

Filipino-American War

- ◆ Filipinos felt betrayed by Treaty of Paris.
- ◆ February 4, 1899: fighting between American and Filipino troops sparked war.
- ◆ 1902: U.S. colonial rule is established after a brutal war.

Spheres of Influence Regions dominated and controlled by an outside power.



These developments alarmed the American business community. It was confident that given an equal opportunity, the United States would prevail in international trade because of its efficient production and marketing systems. But the creation of exclusive spheres of influence would limit the opportunity to compete. In early 1898, business leaders organized the Committee on American Interests in China to lobby Washington to promote American trade in the shrinking Chinese market. The committee persuaded the nation's chambers of commerce to petition the McKinley administration to act. And the State Department soon reported that, given overproduction for the home market, "the United States has important interests at stake in the partition of commercial facilities in regions which are likely to offer developing markets for its goods. Nowhere is this consideration of more interest than in its relation to the Chinese Empire."

In 1899, Secretary of State John Hay asked the imperial powers to maintain an **Open Door** for the commercial and financial activities of all nations within their Chinese spheres of influence. Privately, Hay had already approved a plan to seize a Chinese port for the United States if necessary to join in the partition of China, but equal opportunity for trade and investment would serve American interests far better. It would avoid the expense of military occupation, avert further domestic criticism of U.S. imperialism, and guarantee a wider sphere for American business.

The other nations replied evasively, except for Russia, which rejected the Open Door concept. In 1900, an antiforeign Chinese nationalist movement known as the Boxers laid siege to the diplomatic quarters in Beijing. The defeat of the Boxer Rebellion by a multinational military force, to which the United States contributed troops, again raised the prospect of a division of China among colonial powers. Hay sent a second Open Door note, reaffirming "the principle of equal and impartial trade" and respect for China's territorial integrity.

The Open Door became a cardinal doctrine of American foreign policy in the twentieth century. The United States promoted an informal or economic empire, as opposed to the traditional territorial colonial empire that Americans preferred to identify with European powers. Henceforth, American economic interests expected the U.S. government to oppose any developments that threatened to close other nations' economies to American penetration and to advance "private enterprise" abroad.

QUICK REVIEW

Trade with China

- ◆ American business interests lobbied for access to China's markets.
- ◆ 1899: Secretary of State John Hay calls for an Open Door policy.
- ◆ Open Door became a central doctrine of American foreign policy.

RIVALRY WITH JAPAN AND RUSSIA

At the turn of the twentieth century, both the Japanese and the Russians were more deeply involved in East Asia than the United States was. They expressed little support for the Open Door, which they correctly saw as favoring American interests over their own. But in pursuing their ambitions in China, the two came into conflict with each other. Japan in 1904 attacked the Russian fleet at Port Arthur and defeated the Russians in Manchuria.

In this Russo-Japanese war, American sympathies lay with Japan, for the Russians were attempting to close Manchuria to foreign trade. President Theodore Roosevelt thus welcomed the Japanese attack in the belief that "Japan is playing our game." But he soon feared that an overwhelming Japanese victory could threaten American interests as much as Russian expansionism did, so he skillfully mediated an end to the war. In the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905, Japan won control of Russia's sphere of influence in Manchuria, half the Russian island of Sakhalin, and recognition of its domination of Korea.

This treaty marked Japan's emergence as a great power, but ironically, it worsened relations with the United States. Anti-American riots broke out in Tokyo. The Japanese people blamed Roosevelt for obstructing further Japanese gains. Tensions were then aggravated by San Francisco's decision in 1906 to segregate

Open Door American policy of seeking equal trade and investment opportunities in foreign nations or regions.



Asian schoolchildren to avoid affecting the “youthful impressions” of white children. Japan regarded this as a racist insult, and Roosevelt worried that “the infernal fools in California” would provoke war. Finally he got the school order rescinded in exchange for his limiting Japanese immigration. Under the **Gentlemen’s Agreement**, Japan agreed not to issue passports to workers coming to the United States, and the United States promised not to prohibit Japanese immigration overtly or completely.

To calm their mutual suspicions in East Asia, the United States and Japan adopted other agreements but failed to halt the deteriorating relationship. Increasingly, Japan began to exclude American trade from its territories in East Asia and to press for further control over China. Elihu Root, Roosevelt’s secretary of state, insisted that the Open Door and American access be maintained but asserted also that the United States did not want to be “a protagonist in a controversy in China with Russia and Japan or with either of them.” This paradox would plague American foreign policy in Asia for decades.

Gentlemen’s Agreement A diplomatic agreement in 1907 between Japan and the United States curtailing but not abolishing Japanese immigration.

IMPERIAL POWER: THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA, 1899–1917

In Latin America, where no major powers directly challenged American objectives, the United States was more successful in exercising imperial power (see Map 22–3). In the two decades after the Spanish-American War, the United States intervened militarily in Latin America no fewer than twenty times to promote its own strategic and economic interests. Policymakers believed that these goals required restricting the influence of European nations in the region, building an isthmian canal under American control, and establishing the order thought necessary for American trade and investments to expand. Intervention at times achieved these goals, but it often ignored the wishes and interests of Latin Americans, provoked resistance and disorder, and created lasting ill will.

U.S. RULE IN PUERTO RICO

Well before 1898, expansionists like James G. Blaine had advocated acquiring Puerto Rico because of its strategic location in the Caribbean. During the Spanish-American War, Roosevelt urged Washington, “Do not make peace until we get” Puerto Rico. Military invasion and the Treaty of Paris soon brought the island under American rule.

In 1900, the United States established a civil government, but it was under U.S. control, and popular participation was even less than under Spain. In the so-called *Insular Cases* (1901), the Supreme Court upheld Congress’s authority to establish an inferior status for Puerto Rico, as an “unincorporated territory” without promise of statehood. Disappointed Puerto Ricans pressed to end this colonial status. In 1917, the United States granted citizenship and greater political rights to Puerto Ricans, but their island remained an unincorporated territory under an American governor appointed by the president.

Economic development also disappointed most islanders, for American investors quickly gained control of the best land and pursued large-scale sugar production for the U.S. market. By 1929, the new governor—ironically, Theodore Roosevelt Jr.—found that under the domination of American capital, “poverty was wide spread and hunger, almost to the verge of starvation, common.” A subsequent investigation concluded that while “the influx of capital has increased the efficiency of production and promoted general economic development,” the benefits had gone largely to Americans, not ordinary Puerto Ricans, whose conditions were “deplorable.” Increasingly, they left their homes to seek work in the United States.

WHAT WAS at stake for the United States in Puerto Rico, Cuba, and Panama?



MAP EXPLORATION

To explore an interactive version of this map, go to <http://www.prenhall.com/goldfield2/map22.3>



MAP 22-3

The United States in the Caribbean For strategic and economic reasons, the United States repeatedly intervened in the Caribbean in the first three decades of the twentieth century. Such interventions protected the U.S. claim to dominance but often provoked great hostility among Latin Americans.

WHAT WERE the arguments for and against the repeated United States interventions in the Caribbean?

CUBA AS A U.S. PROTECTORATE

Despite the Teller Amendment, the Spanish-American War did not leave Cuba independent. McKinley opposed independence and a U.S. military government was established in the island. Only in 1900, when the Democrats made an issue of imperialism, did McKinley summon a Cuban convention to draft a constitution under the direction of the American military governor, General Leonard Wood. This constitution restricted suffrage on the basis of property and education, leaving few Cubans with the right to vote.

The United States made troop withdrawal contingent on Cuba's adding to its constitution the provisions of the **Platt Amendment**, which restricted Cuba's autonomy in diplomatic relations with other countries and in internal financial policies, required Cuba to lease naval bases to the United States, and, most important, authorized U.S. intervention to maintain order and preserve Cuban

Platt Amendment A stipulation the United States had inserted into the Cuban constitution in 1901 restricting Cuban autonomy and authorizing U.S. intervention and naval bases.



independence. As General Wood correctly observed, “There is, of course, little or no independence left Cuba under the Platt Amendment.”

Cubans quickly learned that fact when the United States prevented Cuba from extending the same trade privileges to the British that U.S. merchants enjoyed. The Open Door would not apply in the Caribbean, which was to be an American sphere of influence. To preserve that influence, the United States sent troops into Cuba three times between 1906 and 1917 (Roosevelt admitted his recurrent itch to “wipe its people off the face of the earth”). The last occupation lasted six years.

During their occupations of Cuba, the Americans modernized its financial system, built roads and public schools, and developed a public health and sanitation program that eradicated the deadly disease of yellow fever. But most Cubans thought these material benefits did not compensate for their loss of political and economic independence.

THE PANAMA CANAL

The Spanish-American War intensified the long American interest in a canal through Central America to eliminate the lengthy and dangerous ocean route around South America. Its commercial value seemed obvious, but the war emphasized its strategic importance. McKinley declared that a canal was now “demanded by the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands and the prospective expansion of our influence and commerce in the Pacific.”

Theodore Roosevelt moved quickly to implement McKinley’s commitment to a canal after becoming president in 1901. His canal diplomacy helped establish the assertive presidency that has characterized U.S. foreign policy in the twentieth century.

Possible canal sites included Nicaragua and Panama, then part of Colombia. A canal through Panama would require an elaborate system of locks. But the French-owned Panama Canal Company had been unsuccessfully trying to build a canal in Panama and was now eager to sell its rights to the project before they expired in 1904.

In 1902, Congress directed Roosevelt to purchase the French company’s claims for \$40 million and build the canal in Panama if Colombia ceded a strip of land across the isthmus on reasonable terms. Otherwise, Roosevelt was to negotiate with Nicaragua for the alternate route. In 1903, Roosevelt pressed Colombia to sell a canal zone to the United States for \$10 million and an annual payment of \$250,000. Colombia, however, rejected the proposal, fearing the loss of its sovereignty in Panama and hoping for more money. After all, when the Panama Canal Company’s rights expired, Colombia could then legitimately collect the \$40 million so generously offered the company.

Roosevelt warned “those contemptible little creatures” in Colombia that they were “imperiling their own future.” Instead of using direct force Roosevelt worked with Philippe Bunau-Varilla, a French official of the Panama Canal Company, to exploit long-smoldering Panamanian discontent with Colombia. Roosevelt’s purpose was to get the canal zone, Bunau-Varilla’s to get the American money. Roosevelt ordered U.S. naval forces to Panama; from New York, Bunau-Varilla coordinated a revolt against Colombian authority directed by officials of the Panama Railroad, owned by Bunau-Varilla’s canal company. The bloodless “revolution” succeeded when U.S. forces prevented Colombian troops from landing in Panama, although the United States was bound by treaty to maintain Colombian sovereignty. Bunau-Varilla promptly signed a treaty accepting Roosevelt’s original terms for a canal zone and making Panama a U.S. protectorate. Panamanians themselves denounced the treaty for surrendering sovereignty in the zone to the United States, which took formal control of the canal zone in 1904 and completed construction of the Panama Canal in 1914.

Many Americans were appalled by what the *Chicago American* called Roosevelt’s “rough-riding assault upon another republic over the shattered wreckage of international law and diplomatic usage.” But others, as *Public Opinion* reported, wanted a



20-6

Theodore Roosevelt,
Third Annual Message
to Congress (1903)

QUICK REVIEW

Acquisition of the Canal Zone

- ◆ Possible canal sites were located in Nicaragua and Panama (then part of Colombia).
- ◆ 1903: Colombia rejects Roosevelt’s offer to purchase canal zone in Panama.
- ◆ 1903–1904: U.S. forces support Panamanian rebellion against Colombia and take control of canal zone.



“canal above all things” and were willing to overlook moral questions and approve the acquisition of the canal zone as simply “a business question.” Roosevelt himself boasted, “I took the Canal Zone and let Congress debate,” but his unnecessary and arrogant actions generated resentment among Latin Americans that rankled for decades.

THE ROOSEVELT COROLLARY

To protect the security of the canal, the United States increased its authority in the Caribbean. The objective was to establish conditions there that would both eliminate any pretext for European intervention and promote American control over trade and investment. “If we intend to say hands off to the powers of Europe,” Roosevelt concluded, “then sooner or later we must keep order ourselves.”

In his 1904 annual message to Congress, Roosevelt announced a new policy, the so-called **Roosevelt Corollary** to the Monroe Doctrine. “Chronic wrongdoing,” he declared, would cause the United States to exercise “an international police power” in Latin America. The Monroe Doctrine had expressed American hostility to European intervention in Latin America; the Roosevelt Corollary attempted to justify U.S. intervention and authority in the region. Roosevelt invoked his corollary immediately, imposing American management of the debts and customs duties of the Dominican Republic in 1905. Financial insolvency was averted, popular revolution prevented, and possible European intervention forestalled.

Latin Americans vigorously resented the United States’ unilateral claims to authority. By 1907, the so-called Drago Doctrine (named after Argentina’s foreign minister) was incorporated into international law, prohibiting armed intervention to collect debts. Still, the United States would continue to invoke the Roosevelt Corollary to advance its interests in the hemisphere. As Secretary of State Elihu Root asserted, “The inevitable effect of our building the Canal must be to require us to police the surrounding premises.” He then added, “In the nature of things, trade and control, and the obligation to keep order which go with them, must come our way.”

DOLLAR DIPLOMACY

Roosevelt’s successor as president, William Howard Taft, hoped to promote U.S. interests without such combative rhetoric and naked force. He described his plan as one of “substituting dollars for bullets”—using government action to encourage private American investments in Latin America to supplant European interests, promote development and stability, and gain profits for American bankers. Under this **dollar diplomacy**, American investments in the Caribbean increased dramatically during Taft’s presidency from 1909 to 1913, and the State Department helped arrange for American bankers to establish financial control over Haiti and Honduras.

But Taft employed military force more frequently than Roosevelt had, with Nicaragua a major target. In 1909, Taft sent U.S. troops there to aid a revolution fomented by an American mining corporation and to seize the Nicaraguan customs houses. Under the new government, American bankers then gained control of Nicaragua’s national bank, railroad, and customs service. To protect these arrangements, U.S. troops were again dispatched in 1912. To control popular opposition to the American client government, the marines remained in Nicaragua for two decades. Military power, not the social and economic improvement promised by dollar diplomacy, kept Nicaragua’s minority government stable and subordinate to the United States.

Dollar diplomacy increased American power and influence in the Caribbean and tied underdeveloped countries to the United States economically and strategically, but this policy failed to improve conditions for most Latin Americans. U.S. officials remained primarily concerned with promoting American control and extracting American profits from the region, not with the well-being of its population. Not surprisingly, dollar diplomacy proved unpopular in Latin America.

Roosevelt Corollary President Theodore Roosevelt’s policy asserting U.S. authority to intervene in the affairs of Latin American nations; an expansion of the Monroe Doctrine.

Dollar diplomacy The U.S. policy of using private investment in other nations to promote American diplomatic goals and business interests.



WILSONIAN INTERVENTIONS

Taking office in 1913, the Democrat Woodrow Wilson promised that the United States would “never again seek one additional foot of territory by conquest” but would instead work to promote “human rights, national integrity, and opportunity” in Latin America. Wilson also named as his secretary of state the Democratic symbol of anti-imperialism, William Jennings Bryan. Their generous intentions were apparent when Bryan signed a treaty with Colombia apologizing for Roosevelt’s seizure of the Panama Canal Zone in 1903.

Nonetheless, Wilson believed that the United States had to expand its exports and investments abroad and that U.S. dominance of the Caribbean was strategically necessary. He also shared the racist belief that Latin Americans were inferior and needed paternalistic guidance from the United States, through military force if necessary. His self-righteousness and determination to transform other peoples’ behavior led his policies to be dubbed “missionary diplomacy,” but they also contained elements of Roosevelt’s commitment to military force and Taft’s reliance on economic power.

In 1915, Wilson ordered U.S. Marines to Haiti. The U.S. Navy selected a new Haitian president, but real authority rested with the American military, which controlled Haiti until 1934, protecting the small elite who cooperated with foreign interests and exploited their own people. As usual, American military rule improved the country’s transportation, sanitation, and educational systems, but the forced-labor program that the U.S. adopted to build such public works provoked widespread resentment. In 1919, marines suppressed a revolt against American domination, killing more than three thousand Haitians.

Wilson also intervened elsewhere in the Caribbean. In 1916, when the Dominican Republic refused to cede control of its finances to U.S. bankers, Wilson ordered the marines to occupy the country. The marines ousted Dominican officials, installed a military government to rule “on behalf of the Dominican government,” and ran the nation until 1924. In 1917, the United States intervened in Cuba, which remained under American control until 1922.

Wilson also involved himself in the internal affairs of Mexico. In 1913, General Victoriano Huerta seized control of the country from revolutionaries who had recently overthrown dictator Porfirio Diaz. Wilson was appalled by the violence of Huerta’s power grab and was aware that opponents had organized to reestablish constitutional government.

Wilson hoped to bring the Constitutionals to power and “to secure Mexico a better government under which all contracts and business and concessions will be safer than they have been.” He authorized arms sales to their forces, led by Venustiano Carranza; pressured Britain and other nations to deprive Huerta of foreign support; and blockaded the Mexican port of Vera Cruz. In April 1914 Wilson exploited a minor incident to have the marines attack and occupy Vera Cruz. Even Carranza and the Constitutionals denounced the American occupation as unwarranted aggression. By August, Carranza had toppled Huerta, and Wilson shifted his support to Francisco (“Pancho”) Villa. But Carranza’s growing popular support in Mexico and Wilson’s preoccupation with World War I in Europe finally led the United States to grant de facto recognition to the Carranza government in October 1915.

Villa then began terrorizing New Mexico and Texas, hoping to provoke an American intervention that would undermine Carranza. In 1916, Wilson ordered troops under General John J. Pershing to pursue Villa into Mexico, leading Carranza to fear a permanent U.S. occupation of northern Mexico. Soon the American soldiers were fighting the Mexican army rather than Villa’s bandits. On the brink of full-fledged war, Wilson finally ordered U.S. troops to withdraw in January 1917 and extended full recognition to the Carranza government. His aggressive tactics had not merely failed but had also embittered relations with Mexico.



CONCLUSION

By the time of Woodrow Wilson's presidency, the United States had been expanding its involvement in world affairs for half a century. Several themes had emerged from this activity: increasing American domination of the Caribbean, continuing interest in East Asia, the creation of an overseas empire, and the evolution of the United States into a major world power. Underlying these developments was an uneasy mixture of ideas and objectives. The American involvement in the world reflected a traditional, if often misguided, sense of national rectitude and mission. Generous humanitarian impulses vied with ugly racist prejudices as Americans sought both to help other peoples and to direct them toward U.S. concepts of religion, sanitation, capitalist development, and public institutions. American motives ranged from ensuring national security and competing with European colonial powers to the conviction that the United States had to expand its economic interests abroad. But if imperialism, both informal and at times colonial, brought Americans greater wealth and power, it also increased tensions in Asia and contributed to anti-American hostility and revolutionary ferment in Latin America. It also entangled the United States in the Great Power rivalries that would ultimately result in two world wars.



SUMMARY

The Roots of Imperialism The United States had a long tradition of expansion across the continent; now America embarked on building an overseas empire. Some Americans favored acquiring and exploiting colonies; others wanted an empire based on trade and investments; still others advocated the United States exporting its ideas and institutions. Social Darwinism, Protestant evangelism, and naval expansion were all rationales for America becoming a world power.

First Steps Despite the growing pro-imperialist arguments, America was generally passive toward foreign affairs until the end of the nineteenth century. The purchase of Alaska from Russia, the growing American commercial influence in Hawaii, and the assertion of hemispheric domination in Latin America demonstrated America's increasingly assertive national policy throughout the late 1800s.

The Spanish-American War The war originated in Cuba's quest for independence from Spain. Spain's brutality in suppressing the revolt prompted American sympathy; the sensationalist yellow press fanned the flames for war. The Spanish-American War made America an imperialist nation; the Battle of Manila Bay gave America a foothold in the Philippines; Hawaii was annexed as part of America's "Manifest Destiny"; and a short campaign in Cuba resulted in the defeat of Spanish troops there. The Treaty of Paris gave America Puerto Rico and Guam and set the stage for the acquisition of the Philippines; anti-imperialists questioned national goals and America's commitment to liberty and freedom.

Imperial Ambitions: The United States and East Asia, 1899–1917 The Filipino-American War resulted from the betrayed hope of the Filipino people for independence following the Treaty of Paris. A brutal war fought to put down rebellion resulted in America's establishing a colonial government in the Philippines. America's involvement in the Philippines reflected its interest in China; European nations and Japan claimed areas of influence in China, limiting America's options to develop trade. Involvement in China brought the United States into conflict with Japan and Russia; Japan's emergence as a great power saw growing discord between the two countries.

Imperial Power: The United States and Latin America, 1899–1917 Following the Spanish-American War, America often intervened in Latin America to promote its own strategic and economic interests; trade expanded and ill will increased. Puerto



Rico became unincorporated, Cuba, a U.S. protectorate, and land in Panama was acquired to build a canal; each was part in America's exercise of imperial power. President Theodore Roosevelt's Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine announced America's role as a policeman and debt collector; President Taft attempted dollar diplomacy; President Wilson intervened in the Caribbean, and his tactics in Mexico created lasting ill will.

REVIEW QUESTIONS

1. What were the roots of American imperialism in the late nineteenth century?
 2. What factors shaped American foreign policy in the late nineteenth century?
 3. Was the United States' emergence as an imperial power a break from a culmination of its earlier policies and national development?
 4. What were the objectives and consequences of U.S. interventions in Latin America?
-

KEY TERMS

Dollar diplomacy (p. 598)

Gentlemen's Agreement (p. 595)

Imperialism (p. 581)

Mahanism (p. 583)

Monroe Doctrine (p. 587)

Open Door (p. 594)

Platt Amendment (p. 596)

Roosevelt Corollary (p. 598)

Spheres of Influence (p. 593)

Teller Amendment (p. 590)

Yellow press (p. 589)


WHERE TO LEARN MORE

- 🏠 **Mission Houses, Honolulu, Hawaii.** Built between 1821 and 1841, these buildings were homes and shops of missionaries sent to Hawaii by the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions. Their exhibits include furnishings and memorabilia of a group important in developing American ties with Hawaii. www.missionhouses.org/
- 🏠 **Funston Memorial Home, Iola, Kansas.** Operated as a museum by the Kansas State Historical Society, this is the boyhood home of General Frederick Funston, prominent in the Spanish-American War and the Filipino-American War. For a virtual tour, together with military information, political cartoons, Roosevelt correspondence, and Funston links, see <http://skyways.lib.ks.us/museums/funston/>
- 🏠 **James G. Blaine House, Augusta, Maine.** The Executive Mansion of Maine's governor since 1919, this house was formerly Blaine's home and still contains his study and furnishings from the time he served as secretary of state and U.S. senator.
- 🏠 **Rough Riders Memorial and City Museum, Las Vegas, Nevada.** Together with the nearby Castaneda Hotel, this site provides intriguing information on Roosevelt's volunteer cavalry, recruited primarily from the Southwest. www.arco-iris.com/teddy/index.htm
- 🏠 **Seward House, Auburn, New York.** The home of William H. Seward contains furniture and mementos from his career as secretary of state.

🌐 For additional study resources for this chapter, go to:
www.prenhall.com/goldfield/chapter22



On the other hand, if there is little enthusiasm, the people everywhere are taking the war as a grim necessity, feeling that they have been forced into it by events beyond their control . . .



Female workers build a vehicle in an engineering shop in 1917.

The New York Times EXTRA 5:30 A.M.

LUSITANIA SUNK BY A SUBMARINE, PROBABLY 1,260 DEAD; TWICE TORPEDOED OFF IRISH COAST; SINKS IN 15 MINUTES; CAPT. TURNER SAVED, FROHMAN AND VANDERBILT MISSING; WASHINGTON BELIEVES THAT A GRAVE CRISIS IS AT HAND

NOTICE!
TRAVELLERS intending to embark on the Atlantic voyage are reminded that a state of war exists between Great Britain and her allies, that the zone of war includes the waters adjacent to the British Isles, that, in accordance with formal notification by the Imperial German Government, vessels of any of her allies, or liable to destruction in those waters and that travellers making in the war or her allies do so at their own risk.

EMPEROR GERMAN EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D.C. FEBRUARY 18, 1917.

SINKS THE PRESIDENT
Washington Supply Short by the Loss of American Lives

WOMEN FEEL THEIR DUTY
Not to Rest on the Success

WHEELS OF COMMERCE CALL
For a Letter's Reply from the War

GENERAL FEEL OF BARRING
Navy's Preparations to Meet the War

THE LAST CANADIAN STEAMSHIP LUSITANIA

East of Suez
Capt. Turner, Vanderbilt and Trelan Reported Lost

Saw the Submarine 100 Yds
and Watched Torpedo Hit

Several Hundred Survivors at Queenstown and Windsor

IMPERIAL GERMAN EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D.C. FEBRUARY 18, 1917.